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We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent 
values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value 
while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as 
well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields 
efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient 
equilibrium.
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I. Introduction
Most auction literature assumes that bidders are ex ante homogeneous 
in terms of the amount of the information they hold about the auc- 
tioned object. More specifically, each bidder is assumed to hold a single- 
dimensional information (or signal) about the value of the object. In 
reality, however, there are many instances in which bidders hold het- 
erogeneous information in terms of its informativeness of the object 
value. For instance, in a spectrum auction, an incumbent company 
that has been doing business for a long time should have an advantage 
in the estimation of the object value compared with newcomers. In add- 
ition, in an auction for selling a tract in the outer continental shelf (so- 
called OCS auction), a company would have an informational advantage 
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over others if it owns and has drilled a neighboring tract.1 The bidders 
who have superior information as in the above examples can be consid- 
ered insiders in the auction. 
The current paper studies the efficiency implication of an insider bidder 
in standard auctions with two bidders, in which one is an insider and 
the other is an outsider. Following the standard approach, the value 
interdependence is modeled by assuming that the two bidders’ values 
are determined by two-dimensional signals. The outsider bidder is only 
informed of one of the two signals, so he is partially informed of his 
value. The paper departs from the existing literature by assuming that 
the insider is fully informed of his value. We ask whether the standard 
auctions― first-price, second-price, and English auctions― have an 
efficient equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium in which the object is allocated 
to whomever has the higher value).2
The two auction formats, first-price and second-price auctions, exhibit 
a contrasting efficiency performance: the unique undominated Nash 
equilibrium of the second-price auction yields efficient allocation, whereas 
the first-price auction does not admit any efficient equilibrium. The dif- 
ference between the two formats can be explained using the fact that 
the second-price auction has an ex-post, efficient equilibrium when two 
bidders exist. The ex-post equilibrium means that neither bidder has an 
incentive to submit a bid different from the equilibrium bid, even after 
he learns all the information and precisely knows his value. Consider 
first the standard setup (Milgrom, and Weber 1982) in which both bidders 
are outsiders in the sense of holding single-dimensional signals. In this 
setup, an efficient ex-post equilibrium exists (Maskin 1992). Suppose that 
one bidder, say bidder 1, has a lower value, so bidder 2 is a winner in 
the equilibrium. By the property of the ex-post equilibrium, the equilib- 
rium bid of bidder 2 must be higher than the value of bidder 1; other- 
wise, bidder 1 would have an incentive to deviate and win the object if 
he precisely knows his value. Consider the case in which bidder 1 be- 
comes an insider and employs the dominant strategy of bidding his 
value while bidder 2 remains an outsider. Despite this change, bidder 2 
has no incentive to revise his bid from the standard case because it is 
still higher than bidder 1’s new bid (which is bidder 1’s value and lower 
1 Refer to Hendricks et al. (1994).
2 As will be explained later, when there are two bidders, the second-price and 
English auctions are strategically equivalent. Thus, our results with the second- 
price also apply to the English auction.
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than bidder 2’s value) and he is paying less than his value and cannot 
affect the price he pays. By contrast, the first-price auction does not 
admit any ex-post equilibrium, because a bidder can reduce the price 
he pays as a winner by decreasing his bid.3 Thus, once a bidder be- 
comes an insider, he will reflect extra information when deciding how 
much to shade his bid. As a consequence, he may end up bidding a 
different amount than the outsider who has the same value, which will 
cause an inefficient allocation.  
The first-price auction with asymmetric bidders has long been the 
subject of analysis in the existing literature. Lebrun (1999) has estab- 
lished the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Maskin, and Riley (2000a) have 
extended the existence to a more general setup. Maskin and Riley (2000b) 
compared the first-price and second-price auctions in terms of their 
revenues. These studies consider the private value setup in which bidders 
are asymmetric in their value distributions. In the private value setup, 
the second-price auction yields the efficient allocation but the first-price 
auction does not. The current paper shows that this comparison con- 
tinues to hold in the interdependent value setup in which bidders are 
asymmetric in the amount of information about the object value. 
Engelbreche-Wiggans et al. (1982), Campbell, and Levin (2000), and Kim 
(2008) have also studied the first-price auction with an insider bidder. 
They assume that bidders have a common value, so there is no efficiency 




A seller has an object to sell to one of two bidders, bidder 1 and 
bidder 2. The value of the object to bidder i＝1, 2 is a function of two- 
dimensional signal profile s＝(s1, s2)∈[0, 1]
2 and denoted by vi(s).4 We 
follow the convention of calling si the bidder i’s signal. The signal profile 
(s1, s2) is distributed according to F: [0, 1]
2→ [0, 1] with density f. The 
value functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable and satisfy 
vi(s)≥0, ∀s∈[0, 1]
2 and  
3 Allocational inefficiency caused by asymmetric information has also been 
studied by Chang (1990).
4 Throughout the paper, we use the capital letter to denote a random variable 
and the small letter to denote its realization.
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That is, each bidder’s signal affects his own value more than the 
other bidder’s value.5 Note that two bidders are allowed to have different 
values, although the value of each bidder depends on the entire signal 
profile, which makes the efficient allocation a nontrivial problem. It is 
different from the common value setup in which the efficiency issue is 
absent.
Let us turn to modeling of an insider bidder. In most existing litera- 
ture, bidders are rather homogeneous in the sense that every bidder 
observes a one-dimensional signal, which will henceforth be referred to 
as the standard (information) setup. We depart from this literature by 
assuming that bidder 1 is an insider who precisely knows the realization 
of his value (i.e., v1(s)), whereas bidder 2 is an outsider who only knows 
his signal s2. The information structure described so far is common 
knowledge among bidders. In particular, bidder 2 knows that bidder 1 
is an insider.  
We consider two auction formats, namely, first-price and second-price 
auctions. In both auctions, each bidder submits a sealed bid and the 
highest bidder wins the object. The price the winner pays is the first 
highest bid (i.e., his own bid) in the first-price auction, and the second 
highest bid in the second-price auction. Ties are broken randomly. The 
analysis of the second-price auction applies to English auction without 
any change. To explain, consider an English auction of the Japanese 
format, and its rule is described as follows: there is a price clock that 
continuously rises starting from zero; bidders gradually drop out of the 
auction until only one bidder remains and is awarded the object at the 
last drop-out price. Given that the price and allocation rules are the 
same across the two auction formats, the difference only comes from 
the fact that in an English auction, a bidder can observe the prices at 
which others have dropped out and make inferences about their signals, 
but he is unable to do so in the second-price auction. However, with 
two bidders, an English auction ends as soon as one bidder drops out, 
so such information is unavailable.
In the second-price auction, the insider, bidder 1, is assumed to 
5 Maskin (1982) has shown that without this condition, implementing the 
efficient allocation is impossible via any mechanism. One can extend his argument 
to establish the same result in our setup.
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employ a (weak) dominant strategy of bidding his value. Given this, the 
analysis of the second-price auction proceeds without further specifying 
the insider’s information other than that he knows his value precisely. 
By contrast, the analysis of the first-price auction does require specifying 
what information precisely the insider has, because a bidder in the first- 
price auction wants to shade bid and the ability to do so is affected by 
his knowledge about the rival’s signal (or rival’s bid).6 In this paper, we 
consider two cases: 
Case 1: Bidder 1, who is an insider, knows the realized value of v1(s), 
and nothing else; 
Case 2: Bidder 1 knows the entire signal profile (s1, s2).
Although the two cases are identical in terms of the bidder 1’s know- 
ledge about his value, he has more refined knowledge about his rival’s 
signal in Case 2 than in Case 1. Note that bidder 1’s information is 
multidimensional in Case 2.  
III. Analysis
We first analyze the second-price auction by characterizing a unique 
undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium. To do so, let us define the 
following bidding strategy: 
[ ( , 0), ( , 0)] if ( , 0) < ( , 0)
( ) [ ( ,1), ( ,1)] if ( ,1) > ( ,1)
max{ ( , ) : ( , ) ( , ), [0,1]} if otherwise.        
i i j i i i j i
i i j i i i i i j i
i i j i i j j i j j
some b v s v s v s v s
s some b v s v s v s v s
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(2)
Maskin (1982) shows that this bidding strategy constitutes an ex-post 
equilibrium of the second-price auction in the standard setup in which 
each bidder i only knows si.7 The following proposition establishes that 
the bidding strategy in Equation (2) continues to constitute an equilib- 
rium strategy for bidder 2 as bidder 1 becomes an insider and employs 
the (weak) dominant strategy of bidding his own value v1(s). 
6 For instance, Kim, and Che (2004) show how the information about rivals’ 
types can affect the performance of the first-price auction in the private value 
setup.
7 The ex-post equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player 
has no incentive to change his action even after he learns all players’ information.
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Proposition 1: In any undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the 
second-price (or English) auction, bidder 1 bids his value v1(s) while 
bidder 2 follows the bidding strategy β2. This strategy profile also con- 
stitutes an ex-post equilibrium. The object is efficiently allocated in this 
equilibrium.
Proof. Obviously, the only undominated strategy of bidder 1 is to bid 
v1(s) for every realization. It is clearly a dominated strategy for bidder 2 
with signal s2 to bid more than the highest possible value v2(1, s2) or 
less than the lowest possible value v2(0, s2). We show that the only 
optimal strategy for bidder 2 is to bid β2(s2) if his signal is s2. We prove 
this by considering three cases separately.     
(i) Consider first a signal s2∈[0, 1] such that v1(0, s2)＞v2(0, s2). Then, 
the single crossing property as in Equation (1) implies that v1(s1, s2)＞
v2(s1, s2), ∀s1∈[0, 1]. As bidder 1 bids v1(s), bidder 2 would incur a loss 
by winning and paying v1(s). To avoid this loss, bidder 2 must bid no 
more than v1(0, s2) and lose to bidder 2. Thus, he must bid b∈[v2(0, s2), 
v1(0, s2)] in any undominated equilibrium. This yields the efficient allo- 
cation as bidder 1 has a higher value irrespective of s1. 
(ii) For signal s2 such that v1(1, s2)＜v2(1, s2), a similar argument as in 
the case (i) can be used to show that bidder 2 must bid b∈[v1(1, s2),
v2(1, s2)] in any undominated equilibrium. In this case, bidder 2 wins 
the object irrespective of s1, so the allocation is efficient.
(iii) Consider a signal s2∈[0, 1] such that neither case (i) nor case (ii) 
holds. By the single crossing property, there is a unique α∈[0, 1] such 
that v1(α , s2)＝v2(α , s2). Given that bidder 1 is bidding his value, it is 
clearly suboptimal for bidder 2 to bid any b＜v1(0, s2) (and lose to 
bidder 1 irrespective of s1) or to bid any b＞v1(1, s2) (and win irrespec- 
tive of s1). Thus, any optimal bid b must lie in [v1(0, s2), v1(1, s2)], so 
there exists φ1(b, s2)∈[0, 1] such that v1(φ1(b, s2), s2)＝b. Bidder 2’s ex- 
pected payoff from bidding such b is  
( , )1 2
2 1 2 1 1 2 | 1 2 10 1 2
[ ( , ) ( , )] ( | ) ,
b s







(․|․) is the density of S1 conditional on the realization of S2. 
The integrand is positive if and only if s1＜α , so the above expression is 
maximized by setting b＝β2(s2)＝v1(α , s2)＝v2(α , s2). Hence, bidder 2 wins 
if and only if s1＜α  or v1(s1, s2)＜v2(s1, s2) because of the single crossing 
condition, which means that the allocation is efficient.
In all three cases, bidder 1 is bidding more (less) than bidder 2’s 
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value whenever he is winning (losing), which implies that bidder 2 has 
no incentive to deviate from β2 even when he learns s1. Thus, the 
specified strategy profile also constitutes an ex-post equilibrium.
   Q.E.D.
   
Note that the uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibrium described 
in Proposition 1 are in contrast to the standard information setup in 
which a plethora of (undominated) inefficient equilibria for the second- 
price auction exists (refer to Bikhchandani, and Riley (1991) or Chung, 
and Ely (2001) for this multiplicity). 
The presence of an insider has a revenue implication that the seller’s 
revenue (weakly) increases as bidder 1 switches from an outsider to an 
insider. Let p(s) and p’(s) denote the price paid by a winner when bidder 
1 bids β1(s1) as an outsider and bids v1(s) as an insider, respectively, 
whereas bidder 2 bids β2(s2). Note that p(s) is the seller’s (ex-post) 
revenue in the standard setup, and p’(s) is the seller’s revenue in the 
setup in which bidder 1 is an insider.   
 
Corollary 1: p’(s)≥p(s), ∀s∈[0, 1]2. That is, the seller’s revenue 
increases relative to the standard setup as bidder 1 becomes an insider.
Proof. Note that the object is efficiently allocated whether bidder 1 
bids β1(s1) or v1(s). Consider first the case in which v1(s)＞v2(s), so bidder 
1 wins the object. Then, p(s)＝p’(s)＝β2(s2) because bidder 2’s strategy is 
unchanged. Consider next the case in which v1(s)＜v2(s), so bidder 2 is 
a winner and pays bidder 1’s bid. Thus, v1(s)≥β1(s1), ∀. This is obvious 
in the first two cases of Equation (2). In the third case, we have α∈[0, 
1] such that β1(s1)＝v1(s1, α )＝v2(s1, α ). The assumption that v1(s1, s2)
＜v2(s1, s2) implies that α＜s2 because of the single-crossing property. 
Thus, β1(s1)＝v1(s1, α )≤v1(s) as desired.
　　　Q.E.D.
This result can be understood in light of the winner’s curse. If a 
bidder is an insider, he estimates his rival’s (unknown) signal to be 
only at the level that equates the two bidders’ values. He does so to 
avoid paying more than his value when he emerges as a winner i.e., 
getting trapped in the winner’s curse. As this bidder becomes an insider 
and gets to know his value precisely, he no longer worries about the 
winner’s curse and raises the bid to his true value of the object.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the first-price auction. Although 
no characterization of equilibrium is available, the following result shows 
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that any equilibrium allocation must be inefficient in Case 1 and in Case 
2 under mild assumption.







 (values are strictly interdependent). 
In the first-price auction,
(i) no efficient equilibrium exists in Case 2.
(ii) no efficient equilibrium exists in Case 1 if, for some R＞1,
21 ( ) , [0,1] .f s R s
R
< < ∀ ∈
                    (3)
 
Proof. Let us first introduce a few notations. Define a function α : [0,
s̄2]→ [0, 1] such that v1(α (s2), s2)＝v2(α (s2), s2), where s̄2 is the highest 
s2 at which α (s2) is well-defined. It is easy to verify that α (0)＝0, α (․) is 
(strictly) increasing with s2, and s̄2＞0. For notational convenience, vs:＝









(․|v) denote the marginal distribution of S2 on conditional V1＝v 








 are similarly defined.
Proof of Part (i): Suppose to the contrary that an efficient equilib- 
rium exists. Note that the efficiency requires that bidder 2 of type s∈[0, 
s̄2] wins if and only if s1＜α (s). Therefore, bidder 2 must bid vs. If bidder 
2 bids b＞vs, a mass of signals s1＞α (s) exist such that b＞v1(s1, s)＞vs, 
which implies that bidder 1 loses to bidder 2 because he never bids 
above his value, causing an inefficiency. Likewise, if bidder 2 bids b
＜vs, a mass of signals s1＞α (s) exist such that b＜v1(s1, s)＜vs, which 
implies that bidder 2 loses to bidder 1 because bidder 1 with such a 
signal will outbid bidder 2, causing an inefficiency. Thus, the efficiency 
requires that bidder 2 of type s wins and pays vs if and only if s1＞α (s). 
However, v2(s1, s2)＜vs＝v2(α (s), s)＝v1(α (s), s), which means that bidder 2 
incurs a loss.
Proof of Part (ii): Let us first prove the following claim:8
8 This claim alone almost suffices to yield an inefficiency for the generic dis- 
tribution and value functions. Suppose for instance that Equation (4) holds for a 
given distribution and given value functions. If either the distribution or value 
functions are slightly perturbed, then Equation (4) will fail. 
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Claim 1: An efficient equilibrium exists only if
| |2 1 1 2
2
| |2 1 1 2
( | ) ( ( )| )
, [0, ].
( | ) ( ) ( ( )| )
S V s S S
S V s S S
F s v F s s
s s




′            
(4)
Proof. Let b1:[0, v̄1]→R+ and b2:[0,1]→R+ denote the bidding strategies 
of bidder 1 and 2, respectively, where v̄1＝maxs∈[0,1]2 v1(s). Suppose that 
these bidding functions lead to the efficient allocation, which means that 
bidder 1 wins if and only if s1≤α (s2). The standard argument shows that 
b1 and b2 are strictly increasing and differentiable almost everywhere in 
[0, v̄1] and [0, s̄2], respectively. Furthermore, efficiency of the resulting 
allocation requires  
1 2 2( ) = ( ), [0, ].sb v b s s s∀ ∈                      (5)
In equilibrium, bidder 1 with vs∈(0, v̄1) chooses 
1
1
1 | 2 12 1[0, ]
arg ( ( )) ( ( ( ))| ).maxs s S V s
v v




The first-order condition at v＝vs is given by 
1
1 | 1 |2 1 2 1
2
( )( ) ( | ) ( ( )) ( | ) 0,
( )
s
s S V s s s S V s
b vb v F s v v b v f s v
b s




(b1(vs))＝s from Equation (5). Thus, we have the following expres- 
sion after rearrangement  
|2 1 1
| 22 1
( | ) ( ( )) .
( | ) ( )
S V s s s
S V s
F s v v b v
f s v b s
−=
′                     
(6)
As for bidder 2 with s∈[0, s̄], because of Equation (5), he must choose 
( )
2
| 2 1 2 { ( )}1 2 1[0, ]
arg [ ( , ) ( ) 1 ]max S S S s
s s





2 | | 20 1 2 1 2
( , ) ( | ) ( ( )| ) ( ).
s




′ ′= −∫  
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The first-order condition at s’＝s after rearrangement is given by 
|1 2 1
| 21 2
( ( )| ) ( ( )) ,
( ) ( ( )| ) ( )
S S s s
S S
F s s v b v




′ ′                    
(7)
because v(α (s), s)＝vs and b2(s)＝b1(vs) from Equation (5). Combining 
Equation (6) and Equation (7) yields Equation (4).  
Q.E.D.
　　　
For the proof of Part 2, a contradiction to Equation (4) is drawn by 




(α (s)|s) are bounded 
away from zero. First, the assumptions on value functions imply that 
for some finite K＞1,
21 ( ) for all , and [0,1] ,j
i
v




∂             
(8)






1 ( ) = for all [0, ].
v v




∂ ∂′< < ∈∂∂ −
∂ ∂             
(9)
We also observe from Equation (3) that for all (s1, s2)∈[0, 1]
2 and s∈[0, 
s̄2],  
2
| 1 2 |2 1 2 2 1
1 ( | ), ( | )S S S V sf s s f s v RR
< <
                (10)




(s|vs) is bounded away from zero. Fix an arbi- 
trary s∈[0, s̄2] and define A＝{s|s2≤s and v(s)＝vs} and B＝{s|s2≥s and 
v(s)＝vs}. Subsequently, Equation (8) and Equation (9) imply that for 
some finite M＞0, ∫B1＜M∫A1.
9 Therefore, 
9 Note that each integral measures the area of A and B. This inequality fol- 
lows from the fact that the slopes of curve α (․) and indifference curve v(s)＝vs 
are both bounded away from zero and bounded above.
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where the first inequality follows from Equation (3) and the second from 













(α (s)|s), and α ’(s) are all bounded away 
from zero for any s. However, considering Equation (8) and Equation 
(9), if s is small, then for any ε＞0,   
( ) 2
| | 1 11 2 0 1 2
( ( )| ) ( | ) .
s
S S S SF s s f s s ds R Ls
α
α ε= < <∫  
Q.E.D.
　　　
The inefficiency result is obtained rather easily for Case 2 because 
bidder 1, who is certain about the opponent’s signal and his bid, can 
outbid him whenever profitable. This yields bidder 2 a loss, provided 
the equilibrium allocation is efficient. This argument is unavailable in 
Case 1 where bidder 1 knows v1 only but not the entire signal profile, 
for bidder 1 is now uncertain about the opponent’s bid. The proof of 
inefficiency for Case 1 is as follows at an intuitive level: bidder 2 with 
any given signal can ignore the possibility that bidder 1 has a value 
close to 0 and submits a very low bid, which follows from the assump- 
tion of the bounded density given in Equation (3). By contrast, bidder 1 
with a value close to 0 should predict with a probability bounded away 
from 0 such that bidder 2 observes a signal close to 0 and submits a 
very low bid. Thus, he will bid much less aggressively than bidder 2 
with a signal close to 0, causing an inefficiency. Note that the assumption 
in Equation (3) is only necessary for establishing that condition Equation 
(4) cannot be satisfied. Even without this assumption, the inefficiency 
result will hold generically because Equation (4) can only be satisfied 
by non-generic value distributions.  
　　　
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The inefficiency result of the first-price auction presented in this paper 
is not surprising considering that it is much harder in general for 
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asymmetric bidders to coordinate their bids toward the efficient allocation 
in the first-price auction. Quantifying the magnitude of inefficiency of 
the first-price auction may thus be more important. This step would 
require characterizing the equilibrium of the first-price auction with an 
insider in the interdependent value setup, which is left for future re- 
search. Moreover, one can ask if the efficiency of the second-price auction 
will hold in the setup with more than two bidders. Choi et al. (2015) 
provides a negative answer to this question; they show that an English 
auction admits an efficient equilibrium. We expect that the inefficiency 
of the first-price auction will persist and probably be aggravated as the 
number of bidders increases.    
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